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Abstract 
Overconfidence can lead to excessive business entry. Here we replicate the pioneer experiment finding this nexus 
(Camerer and Lovallo 1999) and extend it in two major directions: (1) to consider managers as well as student subjects 
and (2) to explicitly take into account selected characteristics of the manager subjects. We find that managers are more 
prone to the nexus overconfidence-excess entry than students are. In particular, we find that left-handed, married, and 
emotionally aroused managers are more prone to excess entry.
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1. Introduction 
 
Perhaps the most robust finding in the psychology of judgment is that people are 
overconfident (DeBondt and Thaler 1994), and no other problem in judgment in 
decision-making is more prevalent and more potentially catastrophic than 
overconfidence. However, overly positive self-evaluations, exaggerated perceptions of 
control or mastery, and unrealistic optimism are characteristic of normal human thought 
(Taylor and Brown 1988). For example, people tend to believe they are all less risky 
and more skillful than their fellow drivers (Svenson 1981). 
  That entrepreneurs and managers in particular are overconfident is well 
established (Cooper et al. 1988, Busenitz and Barney 1997, Delong et al. 1991, Daniel 
et al. 1998, Odean 1998, Bernardo and Welch 2001). Overconfident investors 
systematically overestimate the precision of their own knowledge and skills, and this 
implies that they are wrong most of the times when they are confident that they are right 
(Fischhoff  et al. 1977). Whenever investor confidence outweighs investor accuracy, 
financial markets overtrade, under-react to information (Kim and Verrecchia 1991), and 
become more volatile (Benos 1998). Evidence of overconfidence in questionnaires can 
be detected whenever the proportion of accurate judgments made by subjects is 
surpassed by their expected subjective probability of being correct (Gigerenzer et al. 
1991). 
  Moreover, most people are future oriented (Gonzales and Zimbardo 1985), and 
optimism pervades people’s thinking about the future (Tiger 1979, Brickman et al. 
1978, Free and Cantril 1968). However, because not everyone’s future can be rosier 
than their peers,’ the extreme optimism that people display ends up unrealistic (Taylor 
and Brown 1988). Optimistic managers believe that the expected net present value of 
potential projects is greater than it actually is. Similar to overconﬁdent managers, 
optimistic managers undertake projects more quickly than do unbiased managers. But 
unlike overconﬁdent managers, optimistic managers may undertake projects that 
actually have negative expected net present values (Gervais et al. 2004). 
  Overconfidence and unrealistic optimism may be related to entry and exit rates 
across industries. Entry and exit rates at one point in time are highly correlated across 
industries so that industries with higher than average entry rates also tend to have higher 
than average exit rates (Dunne et al. 1988). Overconfidence may cause optimistic 
overentry (Roll 1986), and such business entry mistakes have been experimentally 
tested by measuring economic decisions and personal overconfidence simultaneously 
(Camerer and Lovallo 1999). In the Camerer-Lovallo experimental setting, which 
replicates the basic features of business entry situations, the success of entering student 
subjects depended on their relative skills compared to that of other entrants. They found 
that most subjects who enter think the total profit earned by all entrants will be negative, 
but their own profit will be positive. Such results are thus consistent with the prediction 
that overconfidence leads to excessive business entry. 
  Here we replicate the Camerer-Lovallo experiment and further extend it in two 
major directions: (1) to consider managers as well as student subjects and (2) to 
explicitly take into account selected characteristics of the manager subjects, including 
“biological” ones, following a recent trend in literature (Zindel et al. 2010, Moreira et 
al. 2010, Da Silva et al. 2012). 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the methods 
employed, Section 3 shows the results, and Section 4 concludes the study. 
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2. Methods 
 
Following Camerer and Lovallo (1999), n players choose simultaneously, and without 
communicating, whether or not to enter a market. The market size is set by a 
preannounced number, c. If the players stay out, they earn a payment K. If the total 
number of entrants is E, the entrants each earn  () Kr K cE + − , where  (0,1) r∈  weighs 
the prize value and is set constant throughout the game, and so  0 rK > . Behavior is 
optimal if the players wish to enter only if the number of expected entrants is less than 
the capacity c. If they do enter, the players prefer the number of entrants to be as small 
as possible. 
  The payoffs also depend on a subject’s rank relative to the other entrants. Ranks 
depend on either chance or managerial skills, which are assessed through a previous 
questionnaire. Thus, there is a skill rank along with a random rank. 
  We consider five sessions of 24 rounds each (Camerer and Lovallo considered 
eight sessions). Similar to Camerer-Lovallo, 12 rounds take into account the skill rank 
and 12 consider the random rank. Thus, we take 60 skill rounds and 60 random rounds 
in total. As for the subjects, 67 individuals participated, including undergraduate 
economics students (26), graduate economics students (15), and managers (26). Table 1 
shows more details. (Camerer-Lovallo considered 110 student subjects: 82 
undergraduates and 28 MBA students.) 
  Table 2 shows the selected characteristics of the managers, which were gathered 
through a questionnaire previously distributed to them. 
  At the end of each round, the subjects were asked to inform their forecasts 
regarding the quantity of next round’s entrants (including themselves). As in Camerer-
Lovallo, this aims to detect whether the forecasts distinguish the hypothesis that too 
many subjects enter because they underestimate the number of competitors (“blind 
spots”) from the hypothesis that subjects forecast entry accurately but the entrants all 





We consider the same rank-based payoffs for successful entrants as a function of market 
size as in Camerer-Lovallo (Table 3). The rank-based condition assumes risk neutrality. 
In Table 3, if the market capacity c = 2, the highest-ranked entrant receives $33, the 
second highest-ranked entrant receives $17, and any lower-ranked entrant loses $10, 
because the subjects are staked $10 initially. In contrast, a random-rank condition gives 
an empirical estimate of observed equilibrium without imposing any assumptions of risk 
aversion. 
  The first result found was that there is more entry (and lower industry profit) 
when the subjects are betting on their own relative skill rather than on a random decoy. 
In the majority of the random-rank rounds in our experiments, 80 per cent (that is, 
48/60) of the industry profit is strictly positive, and the total profit is negative only in 8 
rounds (13 per cent). The average industry profit (that is, the sum of the subjects’ profits 
each round divided by the number of rounds) in the random-rank rounds is $23.28. In 
contrast, in the skill-ranked rounds the industry profit is strictly positive in 39 rounds 
(65 per cent) and negative in 16 rounds (26 per cent). The average profit across the 
skill-ranked rounds is $17.71. The difference in average profits between the two 
conditions is $5.56. This means that at each 2 skill-rank round about one participant 
experiences losses. In 41 (out of 60) random-rank rounds the industry profits surpass 
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those of the skill-rank rounds. Overall, our results are quite similar to those of Camerer-
Lovallo. 
  The results of a significance t test between the profits each round in both the 
skill- and random-rank conditions for each market size show a coefficient 0.73, which 
means that a $1-profit increase in the random-rank rounds corresponds to a $0.73 
increase in the skill-rank rounds. 
  The second result found was that reference group neglect makes the 
overconfidence effect stronger, thereby confirming Camerer-Lovallo. In the sessions 
with undergraduates (experiments 3 and 4), the average per-round industry profit was 
$26.62 and $20.37 for the random- and skill-rank conditions respectively. This means a 
difference of $6. In the sessions with graduate students (experiments 1 and 2), the profit 
was $30.04 for the skill-rank rounds and $39.08 for the random-rank rounds. The 
difference of $9.04 means about one extra entrant in the skill-based rounds. In the 
sessions with managers (experiment 5), the average per-round industry profit was 
negative in the random condition: −$13.33. In the skill condition, the loss was −$20.00. 
Table 4 shows the results for experiments 1 to 5 regarding several rounds. 
  Now we test whether we can dismiss the blind spots hypothesis referred to 
earlier that excessive entry in the skill conditions may be due to players 
underforecasting how many others will enter. Following Camerer-Lovallo, we use 
subject j’s forecast  ijt F  to compute the profit that subject j expects the average entrant to 
earn in round t of experiment i. If the market capacity is  it c  in that particular period, the 
amount of profit subject j thinks the average entrant will earn, that is, the “expected 















For the details on how the method above effectively separates the blind spots from the 
overconfidence hypothesis, see the original work by Camerer and Lovallo (1999). 
  If the entering subjects are more overconfident in the skill-rank rounds,  () ji j t E π  
will be smaller than in the random-rank rounds because the skilled expect to earn more 
than the average entrant. Thus, the skilled are willing to enter even when the expected 
average profit is low. Table 5 presents the differences between expected average profits 
in random-rank rounds ( r E ) and in skill-rank rounds ( s E ). Three different measures are 
considered for each session: (1) the mean difference  rs π π −  averaged across the 
entering subjects, (2) the number and percentage of subjects who expect less average 
profit in skill periods, and (3) the number and percentage of subjects with negative 
profit on average across skill periods. Table 5 shows that roughly 70 per cent of the 
subjects expect to earn less in skill periods, but only 9 per cent actually expect losses in 
skill periods. Thus, the majority of the subjects decide to enter despite the fact that they 
expect losses in the skill-rank rounds. As Camerer and Lovallo observe, here most 
subjects seem to think: “I expect the average entrant to lose money, but not me.” 
  Table 6 shows the results of a binary logit regression of entry decisions. The 
dependent variable is subject j’s 0-1 entry decision (enter = 1) in round t of experiment 
i,  ijt D . As can be seen, market size positively influences the entry decision. As in 
Camerer-Lovallo, when the subjects expect high average profit, they enter less often 
(that is,  () ijt E π  has negative sign), a result somewhat intriguing. Most importantly, 
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however, the effect of the skill-rank variable increases as an experiment includes more 
subjects. For instance, in experiment #5, which involves all types of subjects, the z-
statistic is 2.49. The dummy variables graduates and managers have positive sign, thus 
suggesting that being either a graduate or a manager increases the chances of a subject 
to entry. 
  Table 7 shows the results of a binary logit regression of entry decisions of the 
managers in particular, considering the dummy variables lefthander (= 1), married (= 1), 
emotional anxious state (= 1), university degree (= 1), age below 25 (= 1), and 
father/mother (= 1). The results suggest that those who are more prone to enter are 
lefthanders, married (despite the low z-statistic), emotionally excited, and aged above 
25. The standard deviations (not shown) fall below 0.7, and in particular, age and 




We replicate the findings of Camerer and Lovallo (1999) with a distinct sample in time 
and space and inclusion of managers as well as students. We also pay particular 
attention to some characteristics of managers. Thus, we find that most subjects who 
enter a market think the total profit earned by all entrants will be negative, but their own 
profit will be positive. The majority of the subjects seem to think: “I expect the average 
entrant to lose money, but not me.” As a result, overconfidence leads to excessive 
business entry. Managers who enter also tend to be lefthanders, married, emotionally 
excited, and aged above 25. 
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Table 1. Description of the experiments 
Experiment #  Sample  n 
1 Graduate  students  8 
2 Graduate  students  7 
3 Undergraduates  9 
4 Undergraduates  17 




Table 2. Profile of the managers (n = 26) 
Characteristic Quantity 
Business with more than 10 employees  9 
Married 14 
Average age  34 
Have children  13 
Lefthanders 2 
With a university degree  13 
Negative experience as an entrepreneur  9 




Table 3. Rank-based payoffs for successful entrants as a function of market size, $ 
  Market size, c 
  2 4 6 8 
Rank      
1  33 20 14 11 
2  17 15 12 10 
3    10 10 8 
4    5 7 7 
5    5  6 
6    2  4 
7     3 
8     2 
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Table 4. Reference group neglect makes the overconfidence effect stronger 
  Profit for the random-rank condition 
 Rounds 
Experiment #  n  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  11  12  Total 
1  8 40 50 20 50 30 30 35 43 40 48 45 40 471 
2  7 40 48 20 35 30 43 40 43 30 48 50 40 467 
3  9 20 48 50 30 40 50 20 48 40 48 45 40 479 
4  17  20 10 30 20 10 0  20 0  20 0  20 10 160 
5 26  −40  −20  −50  0  −60  20  −10  30  −30  −30  −10  40  −160 
                 
  Profit for the skill-rank condition 
 Rounds 
Experiment #  n  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  11  12  Total 
1  8 20 40 30 40 40 40 45 20 50 0  30 30 385 
2  7 20 50 20 30 0  40 30 −10  30 48 45 33 336 
3 9  −10  43 50 35 0  43 40 43 0  45 40 20 349 
4 17  −10  −20  −10  10 10 0  30 30 20 50 −10  40 140 
5 26  0  −30  −80  −40  −20  −20  −10  30 0  −20  −30  −20  −240 
 
Table 5. Average difference in expected profits per entrant between the random and 
skill conditions 
Experiment  #  1 2 3 4  5   
Measure         T o t a l  
rs π π −   1.083 1.768 0.303 −1.758  −1.201  0.039 

























Table 6. Binary logit estimation of entry decisions (experiments 1−5, n = 1608) 
Dependent variable: entry = 1 
Variable Estimate  z-statistic  p-value 
Intercept  −0.3185  −2.4549  0.0141 
Market size  0.1142  6.2066  0.0000 
() ijt E π   −0.0411  −6.3204  0.0000 
Skill-rank 0.1281  1.6765  0.1387 
Dummy graduate  0.5686  4.0345  0.0001 
Dummy manager  0.8555  5.2453  0.0000 
Chi-square: 1061.11   p(chi-square): 0.0000   Log-likelihood: −1061.36   Restr. log-likelihood: −1013.46
 
Table 7. Binary logit estimation of managers’ entry decisions (experiment 5, n = 264) 
Dependent variable: entry = 1 
Dummy variable  Estimate  z-statistic  p-value 
Intercept 2.3105  1.8386  0.0660 
Lefthander 2.2384  3.3224  0.0009 
Married 0.4483  0.8736  0.3823 
Emotional anxious state  −0.5551  −3.5858  0.0003 
University degree  −0.6053  −1.4907  0.1360 
Age below 25  −0.0750  −2.4348  0.0149 
Father/Mother 0.4767  0.9114  0.3621 
Chi-square: 22.71    p(chi-square): 0.0009    Log-likelihood: −167.54   Restr. log-likelihood: −181.90 
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